



AIB Bulletin

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AIB Bulletin No. 12

Category: 1.3

Aircraft Type:

Serial No. 78-70388

No. & type of Engines:

Year of Manufacture:

Date and Time (UTC):

Location:

Airport

Ref: CAV/ACC/12/06

PA34-200T **Reg.** 5H-SAY

Two Continental TSIO-360-EBIA
1978

24 October 2006 at 0416 hours

M.J.K. Nyerere International

S 06 53 10 **E** 039 11 60

Air Charter

Type of Flight:

Persons on Board:

Crew -1

Passengers - 4

Injuries:

Crew -1 Nil

Passengers -Nil

Nature of Damage:

the belly.

Damage to both propellers and

Commander's Licence:

CPL

Commander's Age:

34 years

Commander's Experience:

1867 hours of which about 585

were on type.

Last 90 days 154 hours

Last 28 days 72 hours

Information Source:

salaam ATS

Telephone call from Dar es

ALL TIMES UTC

History of the Flight

The aircraft was operating a charter flight from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam. It was carrying one pilot and four passengers and

was flying under visual flight rules. Take off from Zanzibar was initiated at 0355 hours.

A passenger who was on board the aircraft said that the flight to Dar es Salaam was uneventful. 5H-SAY was eventually cleared for runway 14. The passengers were not

The Bulletin contains facts relating to the accident which have been determined up to the time of issue. This information is published to inform the public and the aviation industry of the general circumstance of the accident at the preliminary/stage and must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.

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alerted of any impending problems. However, on touch down the aircraft screeched along the runway with bits of the plane and tarmac flying upwards past the windows. When the aircraft came to rest on the runway the pilot shouted: "Get out, get out, we have landed without the undercarriage. There was no fire and all the occupants disembarked without any injuries". The aircraft sustained substantial damage to both propellers and the fuselage underside skins.

The pilot testified that the flight and the approach were normal. On the final approach he observed that he had three green lights for the gear down and at the same time there was a red light which indicated that the landing gear was not safe. He decided to recycle the gear i.e. select UP followed by DOWN positions. The red light disappeared. It was shortly before touch down when he realized that the flare was longer than normal. On looking left he realized that he was unusually close to the ground. It was then that he realized that he had executed wheels up landing.

Examination of the wreckage

The damage to the aircraft was consistent with the aircraft landing with the landing gear not extended. Both propellers were bent backwards at the tips. There was also damage to belly skins and antennas. Both flaps were also damaged.

Assistance to accident passengers

Two passengers complained about the way the rescue operation was handled. In an e-mail letter to TCAA they complained of a

complete lack of courtesy starting from the pilot to the company ground parties.

The passengers said that a shuttle vehicle arrived on the runway and collected them and their bags. They were driven to domestic arrivals. Here they were made to wait for some time until the next plane had landed in order to collect two more passengers for transfer to International Departures for their onward flight.

At no time were they offered any kind of assistance or recognition for what had happened. The only further contact was being asked for their names whilst queuing for their outward flight.

Analysis

There is also no evidence to show that the pilot used the check list in the preparation for the landing at Dar es Salaam. He also failed to use the left engine nacelle mirror to ascertain the position of the nose landing gear as part of his pre-landing checks. Given the unsafe indication of the landing gear and the fact that the nacelle mirror was not used to confirm its position, the pilot should have flown past the Tower for them to ascertain the position of the landing gear before landing.

The pilot may have inadvertently left the landing gear switch in the UP position in the recycling process. The aircraft made a straight-in approach to runway 14 and this seems to have been a contributory factors to this accident.

When the aircraft was jacked up the landing gear extended and locked without any problems.

Detailed examination of the aircraft was made at the aircraft maintenance base. There was no evidence of any defects in the aircraft which could have led to this accident. It would appear that the landing gear was not down and locked on touch down because it was not selected to the DOWN position.

Conclusions

There is no evidence of any defects in the aircraft which could have caused or contributed to this accident. Failure to ascertain that the landing gear was down and locked prior to landing

seems to be the most likely explanation. The checklist was not used.

Safety Recommendations

1. This accident should be yet another warning to pilots on the dangers of relying on memory check lists.
2. The operator should ensure that all workers are conversant with the company emergency plan. Courtesy costs nothing but is often dearly paid for.